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TIME, PHILOSOPHY, AND CHRONOPATHOLOGIES
Jack Reynolds
This essay is an elaboration on some central themes and arguments from my recent book, Chronopathologies: 
Time and Politics in Deleuze, Derrida, Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy (Rowman and Littlefield 
2012). There is hence an element of generality to this essay that the book itself is better able to justify. But 
a short programmatic piece has its own virtues, especially for those of us who are time poor (which is pretty 
much everyone in contemporary academia). Moreover, it adds a dimension to the above book by more explicitly 
situating it in relation to what is an emerging view in some recent scholarship (such as John McCumber, Len 
Lawlor, David Hoy, and before this Liz Grosz) that time is central to the identity of continental philosophy, as 
well as considering some of the work that in different ways contests this kind of interpretation of the identity 
of continental philosophy (e.g. Simon Glendinning, and, tacitly, Paul Redding). In continuing to side with 
the former over the latter, I will also develop my argument that time is one of the most significant factors 
in the divided house that I think contemporary philosophy remains, and I conclude by offering a series of 
negative prescriptions regarding how we might better avoid particular chronopathologies, or time-sicknesses, 
that are endemic to these philosophical trajectories, and that are also present (to greater and lesser degrees) 
in the majority of individual philosophers standardly labeled analytic and continental. To the extent that such 
sicknesses are at least partly inevitable, akin to a transcendental illusion, this paper consists in a call to be more 
attentive to this tendency, and to the methodological, metaphilosophical, and ethico-political consequences that 
follow from them. 
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: REfLECTIONS ON TIME AND THE POLITICS Of 
A NAME
Let me start off with the idea of continental philosophy, before turning to analytic philosophy, thus reversing, 
apparently anachronistically, a certain fairly influential story. On this story, there is the revolution of analytic 
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philosophy, a revolution whose identity depends upon distinguishing itself from what it is not, othering all 
of the philosophical work that is happening on the other side of the chunnel and thereby imposing a spurious 
unity on something it has called continental philosophy. Of course, that story is not simply false, and nor is it 
false that the idea of continental philosophy is partly a creation from North America in the early 1960s. One 
of the first published uses of the direct contrast, analytic and continental, appeared in 1962 in an American 
Philosophy Association Presidential address by Maurice Mandelbaum1, and it appears that the ‘continental’ 
umbrella term was frequently used in the USA and other English-speaking countries to tie together teaching in 
many disparate and different areas that were apparently only negatively related—i.e. they shared in common 
not being within the canon of analytic philosophy (hence the connection between continental philosophy and 
pluralist societies since that time in the USA)2. If that was all there was to be said about the matter, the notion 
of continental philosophy would be equivalent to a racial cliché, a stereotype bestowed by those not born on the 
continent, and which ignores the diversity in question. Of course, while it is true that french, German, and other 
European-based philosophers did not call themselves continental philosophers, and no doubt did not conceive 
of the philosophical terrain in the way that many do today, more needs to be said before it can be concluded 
that there was not a meaningful philosophical tradition that came to be thus labeled, albeit also transformed by 
being so labeled. 
Of course, if we try to pinpoint anything philosophically that is claimed to be distinctive of continental 
philosophy, we are confronted with some significant difficulties. As Simon Glendinning argues in The Idea of 
Continental Philosophy: “there is simply no category that would begin to cover the diversity of work produced 
by thinkers as methodologically and thematically opposed as those who are held within the continental one”, 
and “the unity of analytic philosophy is a unity of inclusion, continental philosophy of exclusion… and has 
no methodological, thematic or stylistic basis at all, broad, loose, or otherwise”3. Given the difficulties with 
offering any adequate philosophical account of what continental philosophy is (i.e. any declaration that it is 
essentially this or that will be vulnerable to innumerable counter-examples), must those of us who practise what 
we continue to unreflectively call continental philosophy either be deflationists (there is just good philosophy), 
or perhaps take Ludwig Wittgenstein’s advice from the Tractatus and say something like “whereof one cannot 
speak, thereof one must be silent”? Many books on the subject of continental philosophy are largely surveys 
of what is canonically taken to be the field, a survey of the ideas of the “usual suspects” with the odd reference 
to lineage and the sense in which many continental philosophers are responding to each other, as well as the 
history of philosophy in general. This doesn’t do much philosophically with the idea of continental philosophy, 
except to reinforce its contemporary usage and inheritance, and, of course, such chains of connection may 
be almost entirely contingent. Such a practice of tracing hence leaves aside the question of whether any kind 
of philosophical account can be given of the identity of continental philosophy in a non-reductive and non-
backward looking way. 
I have previously replied to Glendinning’s important challenge, suggesting that a family resemblance account 
of methodologies may allow one to attribute a genuine philosophical identity to continental philosophy without 
falling foul of either essentialism (which ignores the diversity of the tradition in question and is vulnerable to 
many counter-examples) or deflationism.4 Such a view must be, in principle, open to the possibility that our 
divided house will cease to be so divided, as well as to the possibility that it will split in other ways, perhaps 
with more ‘types’ or with the central dividing line being seen as rather differently structured, such as with 
the strongly naturalist analytic philosophy that dominates the USA being opposed to a non-naturalism, or at 
least a non-reductivism, that characterizes large swathes of analytic philosophy in the UK but also includes 
most “continental” philosophers.5 James Chase and I offer contingent reasons for not being optimistic on 
either score in our book Analytic versus Continental,6 but here I seek to elaborate on my earlier response to 
Glendinning that focused on time and method, albeit by paying more concern in the second half of this essay 
to the connection between time and politics, but also time and value, and time and normativity. I suggest that a 
concern with the conjunction of these themes is a central feature of continental philosophy as practised in the 
twentieth century, but one that started with Kant and reactions to Kant, especially Hegel and the temporalizing 
of philosophy that his work inaugurates. 
TIME, PHILOSOPHY, AND CHRONOPATHOLOGIES 
If it is true that continental philosophy has a central preoccupation with time and historicity, then defining it 
with any given essence, property, attribute, or invariant method, would be peculiarly self-refuting, and we 
need only think of the persistent reinventions of dialectics, transcendental reasoning, and phenomenology, 
to cite but three methodological trajectories associated with continental philosophy. All such methods affirm 
what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”7—which we might gloss here as a thought that attempts to take its 
own time(s) into account—and this means that these methods themselves are constantly being reinvented and 
renegotiated, perhaps in the kind of manner that Merleau-Ponty envisages for phenomenology, in his famous 
‘Preface’ to Phenomenology of Perception. Indeed, likewise in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
contrasts “hyper-dialectical” thinking with what he calls an embalmed dialectic, which would be a repeatable 
or programmatic dialectic, akin to a scientific experiment that assumes it is uncontaminated by the vicissitudes 
of the inquiring subject, and is likewise neutral in regard to the particular singularities of the object under 
examination. This variability of method is sometimes thought to constitute an objection to the many ways of 
doing philosophy labeled continental. After all, it seems to suggest that there can be no research program, no 
paradigm to invoke Neil Levy’s analysis of the ‘divide’ along these Kuhnian lines8, precisely because there is 
no common method.9 Of course, such objections betray an understanding of philosophy that is antithetical to 
this tradition, and they also remain sore points for analytic philosophy itself, for whom metaphilosophy has 
not been a strong suit, as Timothy Williamson concedes in The Philosophy of Philosophy when he remarks 
that analytic practice is sometimes not backed up by a well-developed understanding of the legitimate scope 
of analytic methods.10 
On the other hand, we can exaggerate the point about continental philosophy being akin to a Kuhnian pre-
science stage, where there is incessant dispute about foundations and a thousand flowers bloom. In contrast 
to such an account, there are some overlapping methodological concerns evident in hermeneutics, genealogy, 
transcendental reasoning, psychoanalysis, and critical philosophy, and between many of the famous and 
canonical figures associated with continental philosophy. In particular, while there is no agreement in continental 
philosophy as to the precise nature of the relationship between what David Hoy calls the time of our lives and 
the time of the universe (the “objective” time of physicists)11, let alone on the metaphysical significance of the 
past, present and future, etc., there is arguably a methodological agreement of sorts amongst the vast majority 
of continental philosophers: that is, that starting with the supposition of the ultimate truth of objective time is 
the wrong way to go (perhaps excepting Quentin Meillassoux).12 Of course, starting with the supposition of 
the ultimate truth of objective time standardly means starting with time itself as having an unchanging nature, 
and so begs the overall question of whether philosophy should be thoroughly temporalized. As such, for most 
if all not all continental philosophers, it is typically held that such a methodological starting point means that 
the time of our lives (and perhaps the place of our lives, since it is both the ‘here’ and ‘now’ which do not 
seem to be found in nature) will not be able to be adequately reconstructed, but it is maintained that if we 
adopt the reverse procedure, and start from the temporality of our lives, we can adequately explain objective 
time. Heidegger certainly argues that we cannot understand objective time without first examining Dasein’s 
existential time13, and such a move is not dissimilar to that made by Henri Bergson and various more recent 
thinkers, whatever the concrete differences in their actual accounts of temporality. Moreover, in different ways, 
all of the phenomenologists and poststructuralists seek to avoid a conception of time that we might associate 
with common sense and the natural attitude (e.g. time is a series of instants that is readily measured by clocks), 
and none have a deferential relation to science in which the truth about time is the physicist’s conception, 
and philosophical account of the times of our lives are relegated to the domain of the merely subjective or 
psychological, and hence (typically) claimed not to be of genuine philosophical import. So we see here the 
manner in which the various method(s) of continental philosophy are linked to time.
Quite a few contemporary philosophers have recently pointed to the importance of time to the identity of 
continental philosophy. Three recent books stemming from the USA all make temporality central to their 
arguments and claim (I think correctly) to serve as introductions to continental philosophy: Len Lawlor’s 
Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy (2012); David Hoy’s The Time of Our Lives (2009); and John 
McCumber’s Time and Philosophy: A History of Continental Thought (2011). Moreover, they focus on some 
JACK REYNOLDS
quite different philosophers, and it is not clear that there is any great continental philosopher who could not be 
considered within the remit of their positions. While the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Lacan is not 
considered in detail in any of these books, both might have been brought within their foci on time, albeit with the 
focus less on time-consciousness than on the elements of time that resist being comprehended by consciousness 
in Levinas’ case, a sentiment that is extended by Derrida. Certainly in Time and the Other and subsequent texts, 
Levinas said many new and influential things about time in his engagement with Heidegger and affirmed an 
ethical dimension that had always been central to the continental tradition, but which he developed in new 
directions14. But to consider what these three recent books do focus on, Lawlor’s book devotes chapters to 
Bergson, freud and Merleau-Ponty, something that neither Hoy nor McCumber do. McCumber’s longer book 
dwells more deeply than Lawlor or Hoy’s on the nineteenth century, as well as upon Sartre and de Beauvoir, 
and the tradition of critical theory. Hoy also focuses upon the latter, but is unique in giving sustained attention 
to the work of Slavoj Žižek and Walter Benjamin, for whom the ‘world’ is time and history rather more than a 
totality of objects or perceptual appearances. In his final two chapters, McCumber explores the work of Badiou, 
Ranciere, Butler and Agamben in their relation to this tradition of continental philosophy, thus considering at 
least one philosopher—Badiou—sometimes proclaimed to be post-continental15. All three books substantially 
treat the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, and foucault, albeit focusing on different texts of each of these 
thinkers.
McCumber’s central claim in Time and Philosophy is the following: “Continental philosophers accept two 
principles deeply foreign to traditional philosophy: a) that everything philosophy can talk about at all is in 
time, and b) that philosophers must be faithful to this at all times”16. He treats analytic philosophy as being 
but the latest guise of traditional philosophy—the “same old tradition in different dress”—thus downplaying 
some of this tradition’s claims to herald a genuine revolution, the origin myth associated with, and proffered 
by, Bertrand Russell in particular. We will come back to this, but if we accept McCumber’s characterization of 
continental philosophy, the contrast with analytic philosophers seems quite distinct, with these two features of 
continental philosophy’s “temporal turn” involving a manner of proceeding that is distinct from some (perhaps 
many) of the norms and methods of analytic philosophy. We might think, for example, of the linguistic turn 
and the manner in which analysis is often thought to reveal underlying structures that are ahistorical,17 as well 
as the insistence on defining truth as independent of any and all justifications (and hence historical processes 
of justification), and also, perhaps, the more general analytic concern with argument and rationality in which 
deductively formalized arguments constitutes a regulative ideal of sorts for philosophical practice, and which 
might be contrasted with “non-argumento-centric” modes of doing philosophy.18 Hence the common charge 
regarding the alleged atemporality and ahistoricality of analytic philosophy. And we know that Quine advocated 
paying no attention to the history of philosophy and Gilbert Harman reputedly had a note on his door at Harvard 
University that proclaimed: “JUST SAY NO TO THE HISTORY Of PHILOSOPHY”. 
While this is perhaps not an affliction that characterizes the majority of analytic philosophers today, as Robert 
Brandom protests on the opening page of Tales of the Mighty Dead, atemporal tendencies in analytic philoso-
phy certainly remain, even if we find this divide running through the middle of the movement—this is what 
Peter Strawson calls the Homeric struggle—rather than between it and the continental tradition. However, 
despite this complication, it also seems to me that the less atemporal methods in analytic philosophy (that is, 
those methods that give pretheoretic opinion, intuitions, folk psychology, or common sense a central role) typi-
cally instantiate a temporal presentism of sorts that is also significantly different from much of what takes place 
in continental philosophy. By presentism I mean philosophies that accord some reasonable weighting (albeit 
fallible) to common sense, starting intuitions or what the folk think, and this includes those that use techniques 
of reflective equilibrium to attempt to match theoretical principles with basic opinions in particular cases. This 
is roughly the coherentist, or best-fit, approach to philosophy.
While poststructuralist philosophers like Derrida accuse phenomenologists of being committed to a prioritizing 
of the living-present, or focusing on that about time which makes our experiences unified and coherent, and 
as being invested in a more general metaphysics of presence, even if such charges are true there are still some 
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radical differences between this form of a metaphysics of presence and either side of the Homeric struggle in 
analytic philosophy. for example, unlike the presentist tendencies in contemporary analytic philosophy, phe-
nomenology remains dubious about the philosophical status of appeals to intuition, pre-theoretic opinions, and 
common sense. Indeed, this is precisely what any phenomenological reduction must first bracket. 
It is for this reason that Len Lawlor claims, in Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy, that notwith-
standing the contestation in regard to understandings of the phenomenological reduction, some form of reduc-
tion obtains for all continental philosophy: “the idea of transcendental philosophy means that continental phi-
losophy is inseparable from the phenomenological method of the reduction or the epoché”.19 for those familiar 
with the Kantian Copernican revolution, the point behind Lawlor’s invocation of the transcendental is not to 
ascertain invariant or atemporal structures of the human mind. Rather, the critical dimension of Kant’s work is 
retained, as well as the search for conditions for particular experiences, but this is supplemented by an account 
of the temporal fluidity of such structures, and hence also lends itself to hermeneutic, genealogical, deconstruc-
tive, and other such approaches. As such, the bracketing that Lawlor refers to may be of common sense (i.e. 
of present opinion), or what Husserl called the natural attitude. Certainly part of the point of doing a critical 
philosophy is to seek to inhabit a philosophical space that is not merely a coherentist weighing up of disparate 
knowledge claims, say, but aims to subject reason—and the activity of philosophy itself—to interrogation. 
Doxa is hence meant to be suspended, or, to phrase it more positively, thinking begins with paradoxa as Lawlor 
puts it, and the point is typically not to solve or dissolve a paradox but to explore its ramifications, something 
that is generally not true of many parts of analytic philosophy, where the opinions and intuitions of the folk are 
often thought to be a decent starting point from which to build philosophical considerations and where the aim 
is typically to solve paradoxes. Chapter 3 in my Chronopathologies explores the Deleuzian critique of good 
and common sense, and exhibits the reliance of many analytic methods (such as thought experiments, and the 
influential post-Rawlsian technique of reflective equilibrium) upon such features of thought. In the context of 
the metaphysics of time, this emphasis upon the indispensability of some kind of reduction means that it is not 
that continental philosophers must by default be considered what J. M. McTaggart called A theorists of time, 
just because they raise methodological issues with any prioritization of ‘objective’ time, such as is encapsulated 
by McTaggart’s B series. Rather, the point of any reduction is to attempt to examine the conditions for this way 
of conceiving of (and indeed experiencing) a temporal series. 
I will come back to this, but of the four “formulas” that Lawlor associates with continental philosophy, the 
second and the fourth are those that relate most closely to the idea of a “temporal turn”. His second formula, 
expressed pithily, is that for continental philosophy, thinking happens in the moment, with the added claim that 
thinking has typically been construed in either presentist or atemporal terms. As such, for him, thinking has not 
yet taken the temporality of the moment seriously, at least not prior to the continental tradition as he describes 
it. for Lawlor, the moment is also experienced as a question with a twofold temporal dimension to it: what 
happened; what is going to happen? As he puts it elsewhere, this means there is a kind of anachronism at the 
heart of experience. There is a sense in which we are temporally “out of joint”: always too late, after the event 
and trying to come to terms with it like the Owl of Minerva flying at dusk; or too early, anxiously ahead of 
ourselves and projecting into the future. Another way of putting Lawlor’s point is that thinking, if such a thing 
occurs, happens in experiences which involve a disorientation in time, a being out of joint, an experience of 
powerlessness. As he puts it in concluding his book:
Every experience contains an aspect of lateness and an aspect of earliness. Every experience is the 
experience of awaiting-forgetting. It seems as though I am late for the origin since it seems already 
to have disappeared; it seems as though I am early for the end since it seems still to come. Every 
experience then is not quite on time or in the right place. Experience, the experience exposed only by 
deconstruction, is “out of joint.” Being “out of joint,” commanding in ways that are irreconcilable, 
the experience is one of powerlessness, but, more explicitly, it is one of violence and injustice. It is 
precisely this “out of jointness” of the relation that raises further questions.20
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Lawlor’s fourth formula is, for him, tightly related to the temporality of the moment and experience per se. All 
continental philosophy is at least minimally ethico-political, for Lawlor, in that “thinking consists in responding 
to the imperative to render justice”21, responding to this being out joint that is characteristic of the moment, and 
this must include navigating these dimensions of lateness and earliness. This might include addressing (both 
theoretically and practically) considerations such as how we carry the past that we are responsible for, and how 
we are open to the radical difference of the future. We will come back to the relation between time and justice 
later, but Lawlor sums up this central aspect of continental philosophy in the following way: 
The last formula for continental philosophy—continental philosophy consists in the movement from 
time to justice and politics, the movement from the question to responsibility and ethics—I think 
that this formula most distinguishes continental philosophy from any other sort of philosophy. The 
connection, the small step, between transcendental issues and ethical or political issues, between 
abstract concepts and the concrete, is the distinguishing mark of continental philosophy.22
This is common ground with McCumber, who links his reflections on time with the posing of a question, both 
in his essay in this volume and also in Time and Philosophy. 
I have discussed some of the central features of David Hoy’s The Time of our Lives in framing this essay 
in terms of the contrast he draws between the time of our lives and the time of the universe, but in a recent 
review in Notre Dame Journal of Philosophical Review, Levi Bryant also nicely summarizes Hoy’s book in the 
following terms:
If one were to cite one set of issues that distinguishes the Continental philosophy of the last century 
from prior philosophy, a red thread uniting movements as disparate as frankfurt school critical theory, 
German and french phenomenology, and french post-structuralism, it would be no exaggeration to 
cite the focus of these philosophical movements on issues revolving around time and temporality… 
what was new in the Continental thought of the last century was a sense that questions of time and 
temporality lay at the heart of questions of ontology, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, and 
political theory.23
Hoy’s book has been criticized, including by Bryant himself in the above review, for not being realist enough 
due to its allegiance to this distinction between the time of our lives and objective time, but also by Charles 
Bambach for focusing on time-consciousness rather than the sense in which the past and the future should 
not ultimately be conceived of along egological terms (i.e. in terms of time-consciousness), but rather as 
dispersed into the diachrony of the Other. This helps to indicate the contested field of contemporary continental 
philosophy, but it does not reject the thesis of this paper that time—or better, temporality—is central to this 
field.
Without attempting to further summarize these impressive texts or do justice to the precise details of their argu-
ments about the centrality of time, they (like me) are faced with a challenge. Perhaps we are all “chickening 
out” as Simon Glendinning says others on this topic have done—such as Simon Critchley and Robert Pip-
pin24—shying away from the uncomfortable conclusion that there is no such philosophical tradition beyond that 
which is being performatively invented through this very act of naming. Glendinning suggests that practitioners 
of continental philosophy both do, and should, feel uneasy about this. Even if this quasi-psychological claim 
were true, which would be hard to show, a feeling of uneasiness is not evidence of fictitious falsifying. On the 
contrary, as many historians would also attest, making a single tradition (or narrative) out of a number of given 
facts is a creative act, requiring groupings and exclusions as well as thematic interpretations. Nonetheless, it is 
worth drawing attention to two recent criticisms of my postulation of a distinctive continental “temporal turn” 
here, since if these objections are sound, they also apply (to greater or lesser extents) to these other books and 
this kind of position in general. 
TIME, PHILOSOPHY, AND CHRONOPATHOLOGIES 
for his part, Paul Redding was recently kind enough to offer a thoughtful review of my co-authored book 
(with James Chase), Analytic versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy, in 
an earlier issue of Parrhesia. His review focuses primarily on the chapter of our book that develops some of 
these claims regarding time. Redding maintains that philosophy was temporal until analytic philosophy. As 
such, he suggests that perhaps we should talk about analytic philosophy’s “atemporal turn” and instead see 
continental philosophy as continuous with the practice of much of the history of philosophy. In the context of 
a discussion of the standard A and B series differentiation in analytic metaphysics of time since McTaggart, 
Redding suggests:
[B]ut continental philosophers seem attracted to the A-series. Chase and Reynolds treat this as the 
“temporal turn” of continental philosophy, but to describe this as resulting from a “temporal turn” 
is to regard the analytic embrace of the “B-series” as something like a default position. Might not 
the difference be equally described as the result of analytic philosophy having taken an “atemporal 
turn”? And if so, we might ask, what were the historical conditions and consequences of this turn?25
Before I respond, it is necessary to provide some background. McTaggart illuminated two ways in which 
positions in time can be ordered. His A-series of time represented a psychological experience of succession that 
roughly corresponds to what the phenomenologist might call the natural attitude in regard to time, with certain 
events being futural, coming to be present, and then moving into the past and the even further past. All of these 
temporal designations are relative to a given present, from which certain events are seen to be in the future and 
others in the past. To put this another way, for the A-series, positions in time are orderable according to their 
possession of properties like being two days future, being present, being one day past, etc. But McTaggart also 
suggested that positions in time can also be ordered by two-place relations like two days earlier than, one day 
earlier than, simultaneous with, etc. This B-series of time—of before, now and after—involves a succession 
that maintains permanent relations among events, and suggests that temporally tensed sentences (like “I will 
finish this talk within the allocated time”) are not required.26
Against Redding’s characterization, however, I don’t think that continental philosophers are simply unaware 
proponents of the A-series, nor that the B-series should be a default position, as we explicitly note in Analytic 
versus Continental. Allow me to quote the relevant passage from the chapter in question:
Can we even situate the “continental” perspectives that we have considered in terms of the debate 
between two views on the nature of temporal reality—presentism and eternalism—that have 
dominated analytic philosophy? Both seem to fail to capture what is at stake in continental reflections 
on time, whether at the beginning of the twentieth century or the end. Continental philosophers since 
Heidegger want to dispute the philosophical priority of the present, as most of the analytic eternalist 
camp does, but also to insist (unlike eternalists) on temporal becoming, on ontological distinctions 
between past, present and future, as well as between time and space. This conjunction of claims 
has no obvious equivalent in analytic philosophy, perhaps because it is not readily compatible with 
physics. Of course, there are some analytic philosophers who feel that the eternalism and presentism 
alternatives are unduly restrictive, including those who maintain that the debate is merely verbal 
because each side is using the word “real” in a different sense: one untensed and the other tensed. 
Nonetheless, perhaps owing to the analytic tilt on developing inferential connections so dialogue and 
communal progress can be made, much of the debate revolves around evaluating the pros and cons 
of two (or at most three) main accounts of time: presentism, eternalism and, to a lesser extent, the 
“growing universe” theory. None of these frameworks resemble in either methods or conclusions the 
kind of positions and arguments proffered by Deleuze and Derrida, or for that matter by Husserl and 
Bergson. Consider, for example, the commonly espoused (old) B-series claim that (i) the semantics 
of “past”, “present” and “future” can be explicated entirely, without loss of meaning, in terms of 
relations to the time of utterance (for instance, to say “the 1950s are past” is to say no more than 
“the 1950s are earlier than the time of utterance”), and (ii) the idea that there is such a thing as the 
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passage of time arises entirely from an incorrect understanding of such semantic matters. This idea 
that the past might become part of an omni-temporal space–time block, rather than retain its own 
significance, is, we think, precisely what the notion of an immemorial past (Derrida), or a virtual past 
(Bergson and Deleuze), would deny.27
John McCumber’s work helps to provide some further reasons for resisting Redding’s implication that 
continental philosophers are essentially A theorists about time on McTaggart’s schema. He suggests that 
proponents of both the A and B series have at least the following two central presuppositions:
1. The A and B series both incorporate necessary features of our experience of time; otherwise the 
experience of them would merely deliver subjective impressions, which might not tell us anything 
about what McTaggart wants to investigate: the nature of time itself.
2. We experience time as an ordering of events, which in turn are things with properties (being before 
and after; being past, present, or future).
McCumber suggests that much continental philosophy (but also the work of Augustine and others) invalidates 
(1) by denying (2): we do not necessarily experience time as an ordering of events, which means that we do not 
always experience time as either an A or a B series. Phenomenological analyses can show this, whether they 
invoke experiences like boredom, reminiscence, listening to a melody, etc. As such, the A series is closer to the 
natural attitude towards time rather than something continental philosophers (with the reduction that Lawlor 
maintains is omnipresent in some form or another) explicitly, or even tacitly, subscribe to. Towards the end of 
his essay in this issue of Parrhesia, McCumber adds:
In order for us to talk about past and future, we must populate them with content: we must see them 
as successive orders of things … But when we do that, we suppress two facts about our experience of 
time, facts which are highlighted in the experience of being-asked: that the future is intrinsically less 
knowable than the present and the past, and that the past is not only relational but personal, and so 
unstable and malleable. What scientific, logical, and metaphysical theories of time have to capture is 
our experience of it. If the view of time as an event-series falsifies that experience, then those theories 
can at best be capturing something else.
Notwithstanding this disagreement regarding whether continental philosophers who are interested in the 
time(s) of our lives (and their conditions) should be seen as roughly proponents of McTaggart’s A series, 
Redding’s overall objection still has some force. On his account, Chase and I are making the mistake of taking 
analytic philosophy as a norm, and then concluding continental philosophy is not like that, but there are, as 
Glendinning has pointed out, many ways to not be analytic, and not being analytic doesn’t suffice to establish 
any meaningful philosophical identity to the idea of continental philosophy. 
Moreover, Redding rightly points out that the dominance of the B series within analytic philosophy itself 
depended on certain prior conditions, namely the timeless view of the proposition, which is something that 
occurs only at the end of nineteenth century following developments in logic, whereas in earlier periods (e.g. 
medieval, Aristotelean) neither the proposition nor logic in general was conceived of in quite such a timeless 
manner. Redding is correct that this is something that Chase and I don’t dwell on in sufficient detail in Analytic 
versus Continental, although it is worth pointing out that we do examine these kind of background conditions 
in the chapter on transcendental reasoning. Moreover, as is also maintained in that chapter, the connection 
between the temporal turn and transcendental reasoning is very tight indeed. 
Redding goes on to comment of the B series’ dominance in early analytic philosophy:
These were important intellectual achievements, but that such a picture of time bound up with these 
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projects should be thought of as the default conception for trying to think about everything else 
can seem odd indeed. from the ensuing intellectual perspective of mainstream analytic philosophy, 
continental philosophers like Heidegger have looked like they were obsessed with an odd picture of 
time, but it may have just been the old one, and perhaps a more appropriate one for thinking about 
a whole range of phenomena other than the very particular issues with which analytic philosophy in 
its early decades had been concerned.28
These are salient reminders, but must we conclude that continental philosophy is just traditional philosophy 
in a new dress with Redding, or should we agree with McCumber, who at one point makes the reverse claim 
that analytic philosophy is traditional philosophy in a new dress, the materials of which were provided by the 
resources of post-fregean logic? Another way of posing this issue might be to ask whether or not continental 
philosophy and traditional philosophy are continuous or not? This is a distinction that Hans-Johann Glock 
insists upon in What Is Analytic Philosophy?29, but Redding’s position at least implies that they are continuous. 
McCumber, on the other hand, accepts that there is a ‘turn’ (with Kant, and more particularly with reactions 
to Kant and especially Hegel), although he also concludes the book by referencing Plato and begins it with 
ruminations on Augustine. 
My sympathies are more with McCumber’s position, especially if this is an either-or issue, but perhaps we 
are better served maintaining that there is a temporal turn that inaugurates continental philosophy, and an 
atemporal turn at the heart of early analytic philosophy. While not univocal, both trajectories persist as a 
significant force today, with the continental temporal turn roughly beginning with Hegel (and different enough 
from much of the rest of the history of philosophy to mark the beginning of a tradition), the analytic atemporal 
turn (later supplemented by a methodological presentism, as suggested above) beginning around the start of the 
twentieth century with Moore and Russell’s philosophical uses of fregean logic. Certainly it seems unlikely to 
me that Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, etc., would have accepted the two precepts that 
McCumber attributes to continental philosophy. If this is plausible, it suggests that the discontinuity between 
continental philosophy and traditional philosophy is reasonably significant, and it is likewise difficult to dispute 
that Kant’s methodological investment in transcendental reasoning also marks a significant transformation—
perhaps even a Copernican revolution—from what had gone before.
Glendinning, however, makes some points closely related to Redding in reply to an essay of mine on his book, 
The Idea of Continental Philosophy. He thinks that there is an interpretative decision made here, and one that 
is rather blinkered. He puts his point thus: 
It may well be that poststructuralists and this new wave have ploughed the furrow of a temporal turn 
that distinguishes it from most analytic philosophy today, and I explicitly accept in the book that 
confining the title to the new wave is a coherent and understandable strategy. However, with respect 
to the post-Kantian line of thinkers who are undoubted contributors to the texts that make up the 
primary works of Continental philosophy, we should not regard that strategic arrogation as showing 
up the unity or even ‘quasi-unity’ of a distinctive Continental tradition.30
Contrary to Glendinning, I think that reading such post-Kantian figures in relation to a temporal turn is not 
merely a strategic appropriation of these eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts; we can see clear evidence 
of these claims in the texts of the vast majority of the usual suspects, which is not to deny that any positing of 
a tradition also involves a creative act. Indeed, McCumber’s book, in particular, valuably details the temporal 
foci of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche, in the nineteenth century in a way that I have not myself done. 
While Glendinning is probably correct that such an interpretation is conducted with the benefit of hindsight and 
involves a relationship to these texts and thinkers that is irremediably altered by concerns that became more 
prevalent in the twentieth century, this seems to me to be hermeneutically inevitable—otherwise we run the 
risk of adopting, or trying to adopt, a view from ‘nowhen’ on the history of philosophy, something that most 
continental philosophers would abhor—and this fact does not automatically invalidate the thesis itself. Indeed, 
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if it did we really would have no knowledge of the past at all.
TIME, METAPHILOSOPHY, AND THE ETHICO-POLITICAL
I gave a version of this talk at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in 2011 and 
Samir Haddad noted that he accepted the argument about the centrality of time to continental philosophy 
as I had presented it, but not the connection variously made between time and ethics, time and politics, time 
and normativity. In what follows I endeavor to make this clearer than it was in its original instantiation, 
although there will be some imprecision on account of the expanded ways in which ethico-political concerns 
are typically treated by continental philosophers, a style that Gregg Lambert calls une grande politique.31 
Hopefully, however, the preceding discussion has begun to show that if continental philosophy is oriented 
around time, it is not that it is oriented around time as an explicit topic, such as the metaphysics of whether 
time is real or not. Rather, the concern with time is primarily methodological and metaphilosophical, but it 
is also ethico-political too, in the sense that it is claimed to be how one ought to do philosophy, but also in 
that it is typically maintained that we can glean some fundamental insights—albeit not universally prescribed 
actions that would purport to hold atemporally—into how one ought to live in relation to temporal experience 
and its conditions. Has this dimension of continental philosophy been part of the history of philosophy? To 
some extent, yes, since philosophy has traditionally been a form of coming to terms with one’s own mortality/
temporality, as well as a place for practical advice and techniques regarding how to deal with the slings and 
arrows of outrageous fortune. Arguably, it is the concern with metaphilosophy and time, or what we might call 
the connection between transcendental philosophy and normativity, rather than (simply) with how to practically 
deal with say the transience of time and death that is distinctive of the continental tradition, but there is not 
typically a strict separation drawn between such matters. 
Without being able to do more than provide a snapshot of this here, I think that continental philosophers 
invariably invoke time when it comes to thematizing the ethico-political and normativity more generally, 
and this often depends on forms of transcendental philosophy and temporal orders of priority. This is partly 
due to the vast influence of Heidegger, including his direct association in Being and Time of “vulgar” or 
ordinary time (that is, time understood as fundamentally what is tracked by clocks) and inauthenticity (see § 
81), notwithstanding his protestations that this is not a moral distinction. Roughly speaking, for Heidegger, an 
inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world is one without temporal unity and an authentic mode of being-in-the-
world has temporal unity, a thesis that is subsequently contested by Levinas, Derrida, and Deleuze (as well 
as others) despite their indebtedness to some other aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy of time. But Heidegger 
didn’t come from nowhere in this respect. Other continental philosophers associated time and normativity (time 
and value) in the nineteenth century, and Derrida and Deleuze, for example, have continued to so. While Hegel 
is an obvious case, arguing that the task of philosophy ought to be to grasp one’s own time in thought, we might 
also think of friedrich Nietzsche’s revaluation of values in which time is central. Nietzsche argues, for example, 
that all ressentiment is resentment of the present (the “now”) and claimed in Ecce Homo that the notion of the 
eternal return of the same was his greatest idea, along with the associated idea of amor fati: become what one 
is. We might also consider Karl Marx, whose rich and varied analyses of the relation between certain modes of 
production and time (e.g. time-as-measure) remains influential. Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript is primarily concerned with the manner in which the genuinely religious life involves a contradiction 
between temporal existence and eternity, as well as the manner in which the choice, or leap of faith, occurs at an 
instant in which time (lived time) and eternity are envisaged to intersect. Likewise, Kierkegaard has Johannes 
De Silentio declare at one point in Fear and Trembling: “temporality, finitude, that is what it is all about”32 and 
Schelling’s The Ages of the World is all about time, prefiguring substantial aspects of Heidegger’s Being and 
Time.
Indeed, in different ways this normative dimension of time is also something that Lawlor, McCumber, and to 
a lesser extent Hoy, emphasize in their recent books on continental philosophy. Recall, for example, the two 
metaphilosophical principles that McCumber begins and ends his book with: a) everything is in time, and b) 
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philosophy must never allow itself to forget this (390). McCumber concedes that we are in a bit of trouble if we 
understand these principles in traditional ontological terms (it seems self-refuting to say that all things are in 
time, since what of the putative eternal validity of this statement itself?), or epistemologically, since how could 
such a claim be proved? He says it is instead a practical counsel of “philosophical prudence” (391). Lawlor also 
invokes considerations to do with philosophical prudence that are also meant to allude to ways of responding 
ethically. Lawlor says:
We must become something other than the worst violence… Perhaps… it amounts to this: If we 
cannot stop the violence of repetition on the event, we can let it happen; if we cannot stop the 
violence of the event on repetition, we can let it happen. This letting happen means that we have the 
ability—the power maybe—to be unable. We are able to obey the law of repetition (we must always 
await the repetition in each event, obligated thereby to forget each event); we are able to obey the 
law of singularization (we must always forget all the repetitions of events, obligated thereby to wait 
for another event). Is this obedience a listening to the murmur of the outside? Is this obedience a 
welcoming of all the events across the border that divides while binding, welcoming all repetitions 
across the threshold that binds while dividing? Maybe this obedience would do the least violence. 
Nothing is certain… In this reaction of the least violence, we have opened the border of who we are 
to others, to all the others that haunt us from the past (they keep coming back to us) and to all the 
others that wait for us in the future (they keep coming toward us).33
This kind of reflection, as Lawlor acknowledges, is indebted to the generation of ‘les incorruptibles’, Hélène 
Cixous’ somewhat quaint characterization of her contemporaries in france—Deleuze, Derrida, and foucault in 
particular. It is not restricted to this generation, however, and draws on a tradition of continental philosophy that 
extends back to the various philosophers Lawlor considers—Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, etc.—and also further 
into the nineteenth century as McCumber shows.
This desire to contextualize ethico-political problems historically, and to treat how one experiences time as 
central to the good life (however that is understood), has various consequences. It means that continental 
philosophers rarely invoke rule-following accounts of ethics and politics. Very few, for example, would 
concur with Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason and Dale Miller, who in their introduction to Morality, Rules and 
Consequences: A Critical Reader, argue that the task of ethical theory is to come up with a code of rules 
or principles, that would, ideally, (a) allow a decision procedure for determining right action in a particular 
case, and that (b) could be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand it and apply it 
correctly.34 Rather, they are instead typically engaged in forms of ethico-political reflection that are closer to 
virtue ethics, in that the focus is not typically on the consequences of particular acts, nor even their motivating 
intentions (in the sense of what one deliberately and consciously aimed to accomplish by a given act), but on 
character and patterns of action over periods of time. With Nietzsche, for example, one key question is: could 
we wish for our whole life, with everything that happens in it, to occur again without difference? Moreover, 
Nietzsche dismisses utilitarianism as an ethics for children and mediocre Englishmen35 and it is significant that 
no well-known continental philosopher has ever, as far as I can discern, subscribed to utilitarianism and it has 
rarely even been discussed seriously.
As would be apparent, I think there is something philosophically vital to this trajectory. for many analytic 
philosophers, however, this interest in how one ought to respond to the time(s) of their lives, and the social and 
political dimensions of this question, makes their continental counterparts look like they are doing something 
other than philosophy. What, an analytic interlocutor might ask, is the relation between metaphilosophy—
questions concerning the value of and how one ought to do philosophy, i.e. temporally—and considerations 
to do with the good life, norms, and ethico-political matters in general? Is there any relation at all? Many 
analytic philosophers would dispute this and theoretical reflections on the conjunction of such matters would be 
claimed to be something more like para-politics, as Hilary Putnam suggests—that is, a politicized philosophy 
that sees itself primarily in social and political terms.36 Indeed, analytic philosophers have been worried about 
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this trajectory in continental philosophy since Bertrand Russell and many others of that period maintained that 
German Idealism had philosophically overreached itself in such a manner that it led, fairly directly in their 
somewhat scurrilous views, to fascism and Hitler. 
Of course, the ostensible neutrality of analytic philosophy regarding the social and political possibilities of 
philosophy37—in contrast to the simultaneously critical and utopic aspirations of much continental philosophy 
since Hegel and Marx—is not as neutral as it might appear. That is because this neutrality is deemed not only 
to be metaphilosophically prudent, but also socio-politically desirable, since it is implied that the alternative 
is a sophistic discourse that is threatening not only philosophically, but also to the social order. As such, many 
analytic philosophers are not actually neutral about the connection between metaphilosophy and socio-political 
matters. On the contrary, even in recent times well-respected philosophers like Jonathan Cohen and Nicholas 
Rescher have aligned analytic philosophy’s norm of clarity of argument with the spirit of democracy and evince 
a moral element to them. Cohen’s The Dialogue of Reason, for example, argues that there is a close connection 
between analytic method, democracy and non-totalitarian stances; it is implied that the lack of such a method 
threatens to presage evil, philosophical or otherwise38. This, of course, simply echoes the formative thoughts 
that were proffered by Russell and many others, as the idea of a ‘divide’ between ways of doing philosophy 
began to be entrenched in the early twentieth century. 
But to return to the central issue of the connection between time and normativity throughout much continental 
philosophy, it might be maintained (especially when viewed from outside by an analytic philosopher) that 
this history of continental philosophy appears to be a history of failures. After all, none of the attempted 
elucidations of normative matters from salient temporal features of experience are entirely convincing, and all 
such attempts are contested by other continental philosophers, as we have seen even in the brief discussions 
entered into here. Perhaps the conclusion we should reach, then, is that this is not the way to do philosophy, 
and that if philosophy is done some other way then these risks—essentially the risk of sophistry, the risk of 
being fragmented and without a research program—might be avoided. To put it another way, if the history of 
continental philosophy shows that claims to transcendental priority concerning time are typically accompanied 
by illegitimate (in the sense that they cannot establish their necessity) normative moves, whether in Hegel, 
Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, etc., one response to this might be to consign transcendental philosophy 
and/or temporalizing philosophy to the dustbin of history. But, again, that would presuppose a very different 
conception of philosophy in which there is a set of neutral methods that might immunize philosophy against 
the risk of failure, or at least against failure of this kind. And it might be fairly protested that nothing like this 
has yet come about, despite the progressivist optimism that undergirds the practice of analytic philosophy. On 
the contrary, from the outside analytic philosophy also appears to be a history of failures. Both Richard Rorty 
and Robert Paul Wolff have noted that after World War II, analytic philosophers still expected to wrap up the 
task of solving or dissolving all traditional philosophical problems in a few years, yet not a single one of its 
problems has gone away: think of the existence of God, free will, the nature of truth and reference etc.39 Even 
today, Michael Dummett is prepared to bet that the analytic methods will solve (at least to the satisfaction 
of this academic community) the problem of the existence of God within two generations: he thinks in the 
affirmative.40 
from my own perspective, however, the best solution is not to give transcendental/temporalizing philosophy 
up, since the consequence seems to be an impoverished account of time and politics that is itself partial and 
dogmatic in various different ways. In particular, such philosophies cannot offer an “ontology of the present” as 
foucault puts it, a “genealogy of ourselves”41, and instead seems committed to an intellectual view that Simone 
de Beauvoir describes as the curator of the given world.42 Indeed, to the extent that a philosophical trajectory 
tends to oscillate between atemporality and temporal presentism it will be limited, especially in ethico-political 
terms, where much of what we desire, wish for, are fearful of, is irremediably temporal. Indeed, it is to threaten 
to give philosophy no role in regard to the time(s) of our lives.
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In his earlier book, Reshaping Reason, McCumber’s last chapter focuses on the ethical dimensions of 
methodological issues and gives what is essentially an ethical argument for a form of methodological pluralism 
concerning time. McCumber contends that the temporal conditions of the possibility of experience show us that 
we need to be pluralists about reason and knowledge. for him, knowledge is an affair of the present-tense only. 
It is inferential thinking. But narrative thinking pays more attention to the past, and demarcation focuses on the 
future. Demarcation is said to mean opening up a gap, as a way of bringing about a future. As he pithily puts 
it, “demarcation without narrative is empty; inference without narrative is blind; narrative without demarcation 
is reactionary; narrative without inference is fiction”.43 It would be clear, already, that he associates inference 
with analytic philosophy, and the other two tendencies predominantly with parts of continental philosophy. 
Moreover, the past and the future have an ethical flavor that is missing from the present-tense (immemorial time 
for Levinas, the future “to come” for Derrida), and to restrict a philosophical account to any single one of these 
times is to have a restricted philosophy, perhaps even a myopic or chronopathological one. 
In Time and Philosophy, McCumber also includes a revealing quote from Quine to help make apparent the 
manner in which a metaphilosophical privileging of one or the other of these times enables a dismissal of other 
times, in this case demarcation and narrative, and thus verges on a form of theoretical fundamentalism. He sees 
Quinean talk of ridding ordinary language of its temporal elements as part of an “old tradition” for which true 
reality is located in an atemporal domain. Those who don’t do this are wrong-headed, and Quine adds, that “if 
one pursues philosophy in a scientific spirit as a quest for truth, then tolerance of wrong-headed philosophy is as 
unreasonable as tolerance of astrology would be on the part of the astrophysicist, and as unethical as tolerance 
of Unitarianism would be on the part of hell-fire fundamentalists”.44 This is a strong comparison for Quine to 
draw. It suggests that there is a fear of losing something that is loved, in this case the atemporal ambitions for 
philosophy to disclose truths that do not depend upon subjective times or historical contingencies, and that his 
fear of losing what he loves precludes any ecumenical tolerance or consideration of the varieties of so-called 
lived-time, for example, or the essential finitude involved in structures of lived-time. Indeed, we might note 
in passing that following the french existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel’s lecture on death, the British 
ordinary language philosopher J. L. Austin, himself dying of cancer at the time, reputedly stood up and said, 
“we all know we have to die, but why do we have to sing songs about it?”.45
But again, my point is not that Quine and Austin are somehow irremediably bad, and Marcel (let alone 
Heidegger) are by contrast good, embracing both metaphilosophically and ethically a richer expanse of 
times. Indeed, we know that Heidegger, at least, has a very strong dismissal of ordinary time and clock-time 
(and presentist structures in general), in Being and Time, one that arguably cannot be sustained, and there 
are other questions about his enduring nostalgia for the pre-Socratics. Philosophically, it is arguable that he 
made temporal mistakes; politically, of course, he did too. Likewise, other continental philosophers may not 
practice what they preach regarding the various dimensions of the time(s) of our lives. While I do think that 
the continental tradition gives us some essential insights into the relations between time and normativity, and 
highlights the kind of violence that neglect of particular aspects of time can do, that doesn’t mean that they are 
thus immune from these errors, from their own time sicknesses. Hegel, for example, emphasizes the past but 
gave very little philosophical reflection to the future. By contrast, there is also a prophetic futurity about many 
of the philosophers associated with poststructuralism that does not deny the importance of the inheritance of a 
past, but which I argue in Chronopathologies does result in a philosophical—and also ethical—denigration of 
the living-present and its temporal conditions. The attempt to articulate conditions for present experience and 
present identity tends towards a prophetic futurity and a philosophy of difference that involves, more or less 
directly, a denunciation of good sense, calculation, and the structures of time alleged to sustain them. As such, 
my point is that there are chronopathologies within both analytic and continental philosophy, and that these 
respective time-sicknesses do currently split in separate directions and form a constellation around that we call 
analytic and continental philosophy (perhaps so-called speculative realism will change that, but that remains 
to be seen).
To see this, it is helpful to borrow some terms from Martin Hagglund, who discusses the manner in which 
JACK REYNOLDS
chronophilia (love of an aspect of time), and chronophobia (fear of the loss of that time) depend upon one 
another: psychoanalytically speaking we only fear the loss of that which we love, or at least what we would 
prefer to not lose.46 We might say, risking a strong generalization, that continental philosophy loves exploring 
certain dimensions of time (the times of our lives, but also the times that are the conditions for our lives and/
or render lived-time unstable and open it to the new and different), and, fearful of the naturalist/physicalist/
objectivist rejection of such times, claims that these are not the proper object of philosophical reflection. 
Indeed, I think that transcendental philosophy can (but in its better forms does not) serve an inoculating or 
immunizing function, preserving a proper domain to which one might safely abscond from mere empirical 
or ontic temporal considerations. Analytic philosophy, on the other hand, loves the time of the universe and 
the view from nowhen, or alternatively it tends to trust heavily in present intuitions and coherence building 
techniques, and is fearful of the loss of such times in historicism, contextualism, relativism, etc., and argues 
that these are merely subjective and psychological rather than objective. It is also arguably fearful of that 
dimension of the future (which we might even call its essence) which cannot be predicted or modeled, and 
which Derrida in Of Grammatology calls its monstrosity. This monstrosity may be dangerous for continental 
philosophers, but it is also the only chance for interruption to the imperialism of the same (this is the worst, 
for them). When Deleuze and Guattari invoke the need for resistance to the present, in relation to the people to 
come, it is clear enough that this has an ethico-political dimension. When Levinas emphasizes that importance 
of the immemorial past, or Derrida discusses the ‘to come’, these kinds of reflections are both meant to refer 
to structures of our experience, transcendental laws of the times of our lives we might say, and they also have 
a normative element too. 
It seems that there is a certain kind of chronopathology—that is, theoretical myopia about time—that can afflict 
both traditions and which has a metaphilosophical dimension, as well as an ethico-political and normative 
dimension. Allow me to draw together some of the main claims I have made about analytic philosophy which 
bear this out. We have seen evidence of a chronopathology prevailing in analytic philosophy: an atemporality 
in some cases (e.g. utilitarianism, four-dimensionalism, etc.), a presentism in other cases (we have to start 
from somewhere: e.g. the intuitions of the “folk”). In addition, in political philosophy there is also a general 
preoccupation with distributive justice and rule-following prescriptions that remains anathema to most 
forms of continental ethico-political reflection. This chronopathology is also ensconced in some of the core 
philosophical methods of analytic philosophy more generally: analysis aims to reveal underlying structures 
(sometimes logical) that are timeless; truth is defined as independent of all justification (and hence historical 
processes); thought experiments are “intuition pumps” that call on pre-theoretic opinion and then structure 
debates by serving as placeholders; the deferential relationship to the best findings of the sciences indexed to 
the present (hence an expert presentism, which requires perennial updating); the prima facie credence given 
to common sense (a non-expert presentism); as well as the general prevalence of coherentist devices like 
reflective equilibrium which take seriously both pre-theoretic opinion and the findings of the various expert 
domains. Of course, to suggest that this amounts to a time sickness might seem to beg the question by assuming 
that such views are false, and it might be fairly protested that nothing quite so strong has been established. 
But my weaker claim here is simply that the methods and metaphilosophical understanding of the role of 
the philosopher are temporally limited and partial. I would also add, however, that any claims to them being 
exhaustive seem especially weak in regard to ethico-political reflection. Indeed, I have suggested that the 
motivation and impetus for change, for example, generally requires both a more utopian (future-oriented) and 
a more critical and genealogical (past-oriented) dimension.
If I am right about the general contours of this position, this suggests that a rapprochement is desirable. 
Philosophy needs to be able to adequately come to terms with what Hoy calls the time of our lives—I prefer to 
pluralize this to the times of our lives—and yet the poststructuralism of Deleuze and Derrida has an excessive 
emphasis on times (and methods) that resist the present while simultaneously at work within the present, and 
analytic philosophy tends to have a deficiency of such methods generally being either atemporal or presentist. 
Whether any such rapprochement is genuinely possible (for philosophical reasons, as much as socio-political 
ones) remains less clear given that some fundamental metaphilosophical and normative orders of priority make 
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it difficult for the twain to meet. This is due to norms like methodological empiricism and respect for common 
sense in analytic philosophy, and the continental “temporal turn” with its association with a hermeneutics of 
suspicion and transcendental philosophy. Hence we are confronted by an aporia: while each tradition needs 
the other, each is also precluded from that very dialogue to the extent that they take these norms seriously, 
especially in regard to the divergent methodological and topical significance given to time, which is a blind 
spot at the heart of both analytic and continental philosophy, what we might call an enabling and disabling 
condition. The aporetic challenge for our time(s) is hence to do what we as philosophers find almost impossible 
to do: engage in a genuine conversation with our respective others, whether they be analytic, continental, 
phenomenological, or poststructuralist. To put it more Socratically, we need to know that we do not know, 
which as with the Greek use of aporia, ought to inspire us to find out more. Such a desire is a precondition for 
any postanalytic and metacontinental future to emerge.47 
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